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This is an experiment on the effect of norm application in a public good game. We want to investigate 
whether a control norm affects the contribution level differently, only in relation to the way in which the 
norm is applied in the game. We compare the amount of public good provided in two different groups. 
In the first group (constituent group), experimental subjects create a control norm, and then they self-
apply it in a basic public good game. In the second group (control group), the norm created by the 
constituent group is exogenously imposed. Experimental results show a significant difference between 
the  two  public  good  levels  considered.  Self  determination  implies  a  higher  level  of  efficiency,  as 
compared to the exogenous one. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Free riding is one of the main implications arising from theoretical models for public good provision by 
voluntary contribution mechanisms. This is well known in contribution problems, and has been studied 
in many disciplines, from Economics (see, for example, Samuelson (1955), McMillan, 1979) to Social 
Psychology (see, for example, Olson (1965) and Kerr, 1992). 
In  the  experimental  literature  a  large  class  of  public  good  games  with  voluntary  contribution 
mechanisms is present. These games often translate the public good’s pureness, using payoff structures 
that  guarantee  Nash  equilibrium  in  zero  contribution  to  a  public  fund.  Many  studies  focus  on  the 
possible variables that affect free riding dimension. Marginal per capita return, provision point, group 
size, repetition, communication, learning and strategy, are the main elements that concur to determine 
the presence of free riding behaviour (Ledyard, 1995). 
According to the microeconomic model of voluntary contribution, free riding is a rational behaviour, 
which people rationally adopt when they have to choose how much of their personal endowment is to be 
invested in two funds, one private and one public, where the latter presents non-excludability and non-
rivalry properties. Conversely, a common experimental result is that the level of personal contribution is 
often greater than zero, and many explanatory reasons are still being discussed for this weak free riding. 
This may be interpreted by following two possible lines of explanation. The first one concerns how to 
manage the gap between the theoretic prediction of no contribution, and the empirical results. Regarding 
this aspect, consider the famous invalidating factors of Kim and Walker (1984), or Fisher et al (1995), 
Chu and Li (1999), Cornes and Schweinberger (1996), Sandler, Sterbenz and Posnett (1987). The second 
line explains the positive contribution in terms of behavioural effects, for instance as due to fairness 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), altruism or co-operation (Sefton and Steinberg (1996), Gachter, Fehr and 
Kment  (1996),  Fehr  and  Schmidt,  (1999),  Fischbacher,  Gachter,  Fehr,  2001),  reciprocity  (Sudgen, 
1984),  inequity  aversion  (Fehr  and  Schmidt,  1999),  or  to  peculiar  Value  Orientation  (Offerman, 
Sonnemans and Schram, 1996). 
Apart from the possible explanations of positive levels, there is another perspective for the experimental 
analysis  of  free  riding,  which  is  about  experiments  concerning  instruments  aimed  at  improving 
individual contributions. To limit the inefficiency level of contribution, there are at least two different 
instruments: one is to increase co-operation by using systems of incentives, and the other is to repress 
opportunism by adopting sanctioning systems. Moreover, there are two typologies of incentives: the first 
is obtained by modifying factors that positively affect the co-operation in the experimental design. To 
this class, belong the modifications of environment variables, such as group size, the possibility of 
communication, mutual monitoring upon the contributions, relevant information exchange, symmetry of 
initial  endowments  and  the  perception  that  the  personal  contribution  is  critically  effective  on  the 
aggregate level of provision, as well as the anonymity and unanimity conditions (Weimann, 1984 and   3 
Orr, 2001). The second type of incentives concerns more directly the aspects linked with monetary 
returns, like the payoff structure and rewards (Sefton et al.2006). Sefton and Steinberg (1996) point out 
how the possibility to insert a structure of donor behaviour - no money back guarantee for the sums 
invested in the public good- affects the contribution in a negative sense.  
In the economic tradition, punishment models are based on the representative-agent hypothesis (i.e., the 
classical  micro-assumption  of  homogeneous  agents  with  optimising  behaviour).  According  to  this 
approach, the problem becomes how to design an efficient system that does not make agents deviate. 
This strong homogeneity condition may be a possible means to explain why, in the real context, the 
average behaviour does not fit with the optimal one. To make the model more realistic, the heterogeneity 
assumption may be inserted. The problem now becomes much more similar to an incomplete contract, in 
a principal –agent relationship, in which the principal is the social group, and the agent is the single 
member. In this frame, an efficient control system would require not only the perfect information about 
all the personal typologies, but also a multiplicity of norms, one for each type of person.  
The heterogeneity assumption increases the level of adaptability to the real context, but simultaneously 
also increases the complexity of the problem to design a perfect and efficient control norm/sanctioning 
system.  
A possible way to bridge this informative gap may be to search for alternative instruments that may 
indirectly lead to a personal conformity, without excluding the heterogeneity hypothesis.  
Non-monetary  and  psychological  factors  are  considered  to  be  determinant  for  agent  behaviour  too. 
Following this approach, individual choices are interpreted by comparing and taking into account other 
persons’ contributions, also because of the mere awareness of acting in a group. Gachter and Fehr (1999) 
recognise  the  importance  of  some  social  elements,  such  as  the  reference  to  the  peer  group,  social 
influence, social customs, and the correlated sanctions like the loss of reputation.  
Economic and psychosocial approaches differ because of the absence/presence of the motivation as an 
element  that  explains  individual  behaviour.  In  the  context  of  norms,  conformity  may  have  two 
interpretations following the two approaches. For the economists of the classical model of voluntary 
contribution, conformity is the result of a choice in utility terms. Subjects decide to conform if the 
alternative option does not give a greater return. In this sense, there is the traditional trade-off between 
costs  and  benefits  in  relation  to  the  adhesion  or  not  to  the  norm,  and  the  preference  is  always 
quantifiable in terms of monetary payoffs.  
For  psychosocial  authors,  conformity  to  the  norms  should  be  interpreted  as  complying  with,  and 
recognition of, the feedback linked to the norm in terms of padronancy, affiliation, and social approval 
(see for example Homans, 1961). 
Recent studies formalise the previous considerations in the so-called conformity models, and they do not 
exclude the possibility to insert motivational inputs (Bicchieri, 2000).   4 
The existence of a norm as a possible instrument to solve opportunistic behaviour is recognised in 
public-good experiments. Tyran and Feld (2005) compare the effect of a mild law and of a severe law, 
both determined by the experimenters. Experimental agents only choose by a referendum whether to 
adopt or refuse the law. 
Our experiment allows us to compare a between-group  effect - i.e. comparing the effect  of a  self-
determined rule, versus the same rule when imposed-, and also an infra-group effect - analysing personal 
vote and personal contribution. 
We  proceed  as  follows:  section  2  describes  our  hypotheses  to  be  tested  as  well  as  the  theoretical 
background;  section  3  presents  our  experimental  design  and  our  procedures,  section  4  shows  our 
experimental results, section 5 provides a discussion of our experimental results, and section 6 is the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical background and Hypotheses to be tested 
 
Our experiment does not rest on a single and specific theoretical background, because it concerns the 
free riding problem in an atypical collective dimension, by means of social norm, voting rules, social 
interaction, and conformity behaviour in an experimental environment. 
Our hypothesis is that the efficacy of a controlling rule does not depend only on its fattispecie, but it 
depends positively also on the presence of another variable, that we call Participation in the building 
process of the norm. 
Let the efficacy be measured by the level of the total amount of public good provided, Q.  
Let E be the level of efficacy obtained by a specific norm of control; F the fattispecie of the norm; P the 
participation. We can simplify our hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: 
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To test if our hypothesis is correct, and to isolate the impact of our Participation variable, we will 
compare the level of the total public good provided, in two groups, one defined as Constituent Group, 
the other one defined as Control Group. The Constituent Group participates in the norm creation, and 
then  it  self-applies  the  rule.  The  Control  Group  receives  exogenously  the  norm  created  by  the 
) ( ) ( P g F f E + =  5 
Constituent Group, without participating in the creation process. Both groups have to take into account 
the same norm, F, so that F can be considered as given in the efficacy function (i.e  F F = ) 
Let Gconst be the Constituent Group, and Gcontrol the Control Group. Our Hypothesis now becomes: 
Hypothesis 2: 
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We are focusing on the aggregate results that arise from a norm application, only analysing the total 
amount of the public good provided, and the total number of free riding after a norm application.  
In order to understand why and how participation affects the efficacy, there is no specific theoretical 
reference, but several contributions may be taken into account. We can consider at least three different 
perspectives correlated to our topic: 
 
a.  Buchanan  and  Tullock  Model  (1962).  This  contribution  may  clarify  what  are  the  possible 
elements that enter our g function, in a collective choice dimension. 
b.  Conformity  Models.  This  approach  may  explain  our  greater  efficacy  hypothesis  in  terms  of 
greater conformity, in an individual choice dimension. 
c.  Socio-psychological contributions. They may explain our Participation effect in terms of socio-
psychological dynamics, in a double perspective: individual and collective ones. 
 
For each approach, we underline below what could be the main parallelism with our frame, and what 
could constitute a limit. 
 
a. Buchanan and Tullock Model (1962) 
 
A  possible  theoretical  reference  for  the  collective  dimension  may  be  recognised  in  Buchanan  and 
Tullock’s  model  (1962).  The  authors  present  a  model  for  collective  choices,  based  on  collective 
agreement by means of voting procedures. Individuals are assumed to be rational and they choose by 
using a maximising behaviour. The model explains when individuals decide to maximise their utility by 
means of a collective action, and when it is advantageous to establish a social/political interaction. 
Individuals are heterogeneous, and a collective choice is an instrument to reconcile different interests. 
The convenience of a collective agreement is measured in terms of its costs. A collective choice is the 
result of individual interactions, in which each member weighs up personal cost and benefit deriving   6 
from the participation in a collective action. A collective decision requires a general consensus. Any 
final consensus is obtained by a process that implies costs.  
The authors decompose Committee Costs (CC) into Decisional Costs (DC) and External Costs (EC). 
The first ones refer to costs that a group has to sustain in order to obtain an infra-member agreement; the 
second ones are costs that members outside a winner coalition have to suffer. In general, decisional costs 
are in positive relation with the group size of a constituting coalition, i.e. it is easier and costless to 
obtain an agreement into a small group rather than into a bigger one. External costs act inversely to the 















Fig.1 Committee Costs (group’s perspective) 
 
In general, a group will finally adopt a decisional rule that guarantees simultaneously the minimisation 
of the expected interdependence costs (associated with the organisation of a specific activity), and the 
expected  utility  value  deriving  from  its  adoption.  In  a  constituting  committee,  external  costs  are 
minimised when the decisional rule is adopted by using a unanimity rule (see point A in figure 1), but 
decisional costs are minimised once there is a single person who decides for the other members (point 
B). A majority rule can be considered as an instrument that, in part, compensates a trade-off between the 
two  different  cost  typologies.  Adopting  less  inclusive  rules  than  the  unanimity  one,  an  amount  of 
personal protection from others’ decisions (external cost) is exchanged with a reduction in decisional 
costs.  
Decisional costs and external costs are sustained if, rationally, the net expected value of the output 
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initial status. In other words, any collective choice should minimise the sum of external and decisional 
costs. 




(see fig.2). RR’ are the positive costs sustained by a single agent accepting the choice H. OA are private 
costs that a single agent sustains when he/she chooses privately. RR’< OA, so that the agent expects a 
benefit from the collective choice. AB represents gains deriving from the personal participation, which 
an individual expects from a collective exchange. Positive gains from the exchange exist when the group 
adopts a choice that is more inclusive than 
N
Q
, and less inclusive than 
N
Q'




, external costs associated to the collective decision itself become so high that the 
agent prefers to opt for  private choice alone. If a rule more inclusive than 
N
Q'
 is accepted, the decisional 
costs become so high that the collective negotiation nullifies any benefit.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Committee Cost (individual perspective) 
 
Following Buchanan & Tullock’s model, in order to eliminate the committee costs, it is necessary to 
delegate the decisional authority to a single individual, considering his/her choices as binding for the 
whole group. Assuming homogeneous individuals, a dictatorial choice is the most efficient one. 
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that the total benefits will be greater than the total losses, even though not necessarily optimal. Assuming 
heterogeneous agents with heterogeneous preference intensity, a logrolling phenomenon may arise, due 
to an imperfect voting market
2. 
A representative government is a general instrument to reduce interdependence costs, because it reduces 
the decisional cost function. There are two extreme examples: the first one is a direct democracy, with a 
direct relation between the number of subjects that participate in the decisional process (the number of 
representatives), and the total number of the group members; the second one is a single representative 
that decides for the whole group. The cost of a representative organisation is directly linked to the group 
size. Also in this case, the decisional cost increases as the number of the committee members increases, 
but the external cost is now more directly influenced by the fraction of the population in the committee 
(See Fig.3).  
 
Fig. 3 Committee Costs (number of representatives/ number of group members) 
 
Describing our environment in Buchanan and Tullock’s terms, we may configure the Constituent Group 
as the constituent committee. Choosing the norm, subjects in the experimental group find implicit costs 
of interdependence, concerning both decisional and external costs. Conversely, in the Control Group we 
may assume positive external costs and zero decisional cost. 
                                                
2 In this case, a referendum is a procedure that ignores the preference intensity. By logrolling mechanism, voting results may 
be modified only if the minority has a major preference  intensity regarding a specific topic. 
EC 
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Number of representatives / number of group members   9 
Let CDconst be the decisional costs for the Constituent Group, and CDcontrol be decisional costs for the 
Control Group, CEconst the external costs for the first group, and CEcontrol the external costs for the second 
group. Given Buchanan e Tullock’s perspective, we may assume that, ceteris paribus:  
 
CDconst > 0  CDcontrol = 0 
CEconst > 0  CEcontrol > 0 
with 
CDconst + CEconst > CEcontrol 
 
In what direction may Buchanan and Tullock's model support our hypothesis? How may different costs 
affect the efficacy of a norm? 
We can suppose that in a constituent committee there are greater costs in order to achieve an agreement, 
than in another group that merely receives an already-made rule. In the latter group we can consider only 
the external costs.
3 
Suppose that the constitutional group voted a final norm G that minimises the total committee costs, C*, 
with the private costs OA and the net gain from collective choice AB (Fig.1). Considering the aggregate 
costs, the situation for the control group may be represented as in figure 4, in which  the cost C* 
proposed by the committee, and the zero decisional costs for the control group are reported. 
Excluding explanations in terms of group selection, the efficacy of the norm ought to be independent of 
the committee costs, i.e. its efficacy may be considered in net terms.  
 
                                                
3 We consider the case in which individual external costs are taken from the same population, i.e. we randomly select 
population with the same a priori distribution of preferences.    10 
 
Fig. 4 Our possible Committee Costs 
 
 
Buchanan  and  Tullock's  model  has  the  added  value  of  decomposing  the  participation  costs  by 
distinguishing some possible elements of our g function, but it does not explain why, in a constituent 
committee, higher costs imply higher efficacy, ceteris paribus. The model clarifies how a committee 
agreement may modify its decision costs in terms of group size variation, but it does not explain why the 
same agreement may differently affect the efficacy in two groups with the same group size. We are not 
testing variation costs, but an efficacy variation effect. Thus, we may consider the existence of some 
other indirect factors that, linked with committee costs, may affect the efficacy of a collective decision.  
What emerges from Buchanan and Tullock's model is that participating in a committee group implies 
higher agreement costs, which are not present in the control group. We do not exclude the possibility of 
justifying the participation effects in terms of agreement cost, but we must look for some other linked 
elements that implicitly arise in a participation procedure. 
 
We now proceed to propose some other theoretical background that could provide indirect support for 
our participation variable, which is by means of conformity models and of socio-psychological theories.  
 
b. Conformity Models 
 
Adopting this perspective implies changing the level of analysis, i.e. from a group dimension to an 
individual  dimension.  In  this  theoretical  approach,  we  insert  all  models  that  explain  individual 
CEcontrol grouo ≡ 
CCcontrol group 
DCcommittee 
K/N  I/N 
Expected 
costs  CCcommittee 
N/N  0 
Number of representatives / number of group members 
DCcontrol 
C*   11 
conformity to a norm, in terms of individual preferences (social preferences, reciprocity, fairness, equity, 
etc), strategic behaviour, beliefs and cognitive implications. 
None  of these  models  give  direct  explanations  about  the  relation  between  participation and  greater 
efficacy. They may be useful to clarify why a person conforms to a norm, but they do not explain why 
the conformity may vary because of participation. What could be the individual factors that may be 
significant to our frame? What are possible individual factors that enter our g function? 
In  several  models,  the  utility  function  is  designed  to  capture  some  individual  preference  in  social 
dimensions, in which individual choices are taken, considering implications on the others' welfare (see 
for example Charness and Rabin (2002), Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The conformity to a norm may be 
considered as an individual choice that affects other persons' utility too, so it can be inserted in the 
individual utility function.  
Adapting this perspective to our experimental hypothesis, we may consider conformity in individual 
preferences. Without considering the participation variable, differences in conformity may be explained 
only in terms of different group composition. However, the Heterogeneity condition is taken for both of 
our  groups,  so  that  different  preference  composition  is  not  considered  to  be  a  main  factor  in  our 
hypothesis. 
Conformity is strictly linked with reciprocity theories (see for example Rabin, 1993), in which not only 
individual preferences can be defined on social consequences, but also intentions and choice procedures 
have an important role. In this frame, beliefs about others’ actions affect individual choices. These 
models may interpret, even if not explicitly, participation as a factor that influences the personal beliefs 
about others, but they do not explain in what direction. In particular, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that the participation effect positively reinforces reciprocal or conditional behaviour. In a public good 
frame, positively reinforcing beliefs about others’ contribution has an important strategic implication. 
Positive beliefs about others’ positive contributions make defecting more attractive. According to the 
classical voluntary contribution mechanism, a rational player would defect if he/she believes that the 
other will contribute more to the public fund. 
If participating activates beliefs of positive contributions, we ought to observe greater level of free riding 
and less total public good provided, contrary to our initial hypothesis. Hence, our hypothesis that greater 
contribution/greater  efficacy  is  associated  with  our  participation  variable,  does  not  find  a  complete 
justification in belief reinforcement. 
Beliefs  are  recognised  to  be  factors  that  explain  positive  contributions  in  public  good  games  (see 
Offerman, 1997). Many models focus on how these beliefs are created and how they affect personal 
contribution, in particular by distinguishing how people estimate the behaviour of others, and how their 
individual contribution becomes critical, futile or redundant
4. Several studies confirm that there is a 
                                                
4Offerman (1997, Chapter 2) distinguishes three relevant states of world that determine individual contribution, according to   12 
positive  correlation  between  subjective  estimated  probability  of  being  critical,  and  propensity  to 
contribute (see for example Caporael et al. (1989), Dawes et al. (1986), Rapoport et al. (1989) and 
Suleiman et al. 1992). 
Also  following  this  perspective,  we  have  the  added  value  in  understanding  what  affects  individual 
choices by means of expected contribution of other members, but we do not have any direct quotation 
about the role of participation. In particular, we cannot exclude that participation activates mechanisms 
that involve both probabilistic beliefs and cognitive systems, because - for example- people signal any 
particular  conformity behaviour  by  voting a  particular  rule, or because of a  particular ‘focal point’ 
moved by the creation of the norm. 
We suppose that participation positively affects the total amount of public good provided. As said at the 
beginning,  we  consider  a  positive  relation  between  participation  and  norm  efficacy.  But  if  a  norm 
efficacy is associated also with the level at which an individual complies, it could be useful to recognise 
the elements that concur to norm compliance. We, however, focus on aggregate effects, because we are 
analysing group differences, so that we are searching for reasons that may support variations among 
groups,  and  not  infra  group.  If  we justify  our  position  in  terms  of  conformist  preferences  (see  for 
example  Grimalda  and  Sacconi,  2002),  we  will  focus  on  individual  preferences,  and  compliance 
variations  among  groups  will  be  explained  in  terms  of  group  composition.  We  are  not  taking  into 
                                                                                                                                                                   
how this is perceived in a group size dimension (s). Contribution may be: 
a) futile: public good will not be provided no matter the individual choice, that is fewer than s-1 of the other subjects 
contribute (where s means the threshold)  
b) critical: exactly s-1 contribute 
c) redundant: the public good will be provided whatever the individual choice, that is more than s-1 contribute. 
According to this theory, people associate subjective probability with the personal contribution, that is they have different 
estimations about P(< s-1), P(s-1), P(> s-1). Often individual probability estimations are distinguished according to the type 
of agents, for example: 
a) Material cooperators (Warr, 1982). Here, people are assumed to acquire an extra social utility x for the provision of the 
public good. People contribute if and only if: 
P(s-1)≥ 
x c s f
c
+ − ) (
  
Where 
c: cost for contributing, 
f(s)-c: value of public good 
b) Warm glow cooperators (Andreoni, 1993). The act of contributing makes people feel good about themselves, acquiring an 








c) Social identity theory and in-group cooperators (Taifel, Turner (1986), Taylor, 1994). Here it is recognized that self- 
imaging obtains an extra utility z if they belong to the group that provides the public good. People contributes iff: 
P(s-1)≥ 








As in the expected value hypothesis, also in expected utility theory people are assumed to make no errors in their evaluation. 
Under both hypotheses, people give the best responses to their expectations. However, in recent literature it is well recognised 
that such assumptions determine strong cognitive limitations. To allow people to make errors during their evaluation, quantal 
response approach is well fitting (McFadden, 1976; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).   13 
account what an individual chooses in a game with a control norm, but we are investigating if, and 
eventually why, he/she may choose differently according to the participation in a creation norm.  
Bicchieri (1997) considers social norms in terms of independent motivating factors. She says that norms 
usually allow an individual to anticipate the behaviour of the others. In this sense, conformity is the 
result of preferences and beliefs (motivating factors), given the following two conditions:  
1. “Almost every member of the population prefers to conform to the regularity, on  condition (and only 
on condition) that almost everyone else conforms, too. 
2. Almost every member of the population believes that almost every other member of the population 
conforms to R” (where R is the regularity). (See Bicchieri, 1997, pages. 27). 
A social norm is an equilibrium, in the game theoretic sense of being a combination of strategies, one for 
each individual, such that each individual’s strategy is a best reply to the others' strategies, where one 
takes  them  as  given.  Each  individual  prefers  to  conform  on  condition  that  nearly  everybody  else 
conforms to the norm. The conditional preference does not imply that conformity is a dominant strategy. 
In a development of her model of norm compliance (Bicchieri, 2000), Bicchieri assumes that conformity 
reasons are different from those recognised in reciprocity and conformist preferences. She assumes that 
there exist several individual reasons that make people comply but, above all, she recognises the role of 
the context in which people have to decide. In a certain sense, the context is able to activate some 
cognitive mechanisms, and compliance is explained in terms of individual conformity- categorisation 
recognition. Categorisation seems to be a macro class that could be useful to distinguish our two groups. 
The Constituent group may be categorised differently from the Control Group, but Bicchieri’s model 
does not explain why participation may be categorised differently, and activate different conformity 
mechanisms. 
As seen above, several economic models can be quoted and extended to our hypothesis, but no one in 
particular is able to fully recognise our hypothesis. Some socio-psychological contributions are now 
considered, in order to investigate if they could fill the previous gap. 
 
c. Socio –psychological contributions 
 
Socio –psychological disciplines have an old tradition in group dynamic studies, and we may consider 
them to open our g function ‘black box’. The role of participation may be thought about combination of 
other  socio-  psychological  and  cognitive  elements,  both  in  an  individual  perspective  (by  means  of 
beliefs, closeness effect, effectiveness effect, awareness effects), and in an individual-group relationship 
(by means of group dynamics, goal insetting, procedural decomposition, and inner coherence). These 
contributions have to be adapted to our experimental frame, but they are not so far from it, because also 
in  the  socio-psychological  approach  the  free  riding  problem  is  well  know  in  the  so-called  Social 
Dilemmas.   14 
Beliefs and expectations about others’ behaviour are often self-centred, that is, people tend to use their 
behaviour as a cue in predicting the choices of other people (see Dawes et al., 1977). People give a 
pivotal role to self- knowledge as a source of social hypothesis (Allport, 1924).  
The main difference among psychological contributions is recognised in the causal relationship between 
expectations  and  behaviour,  that  is,  if  expectations  determine  behaviour  or  vice  versa.  The  former 
direction characterizes the so called Triangle Hypothesis (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970), while the latter 
direction-  i.e.  behaviour  determines  expectations-  is  the  so-called  false  Consensus  (Kuhlman  and 
Wimblerly, 1976).  
Following these two different approaches, different levels of contributions may be interpreted according 
to the causal effects of three distinct individual characterisations (see Offerman, 1997). According to the 
Triangle  hypothesis,  Competitors  do  not  contribute,  and  expect  the  others  not  to  contribute  either. 
Individualists contribute if and only if they expect the others to. Co-operators contribute as long as they 
do not perceive they are being exploited. 
According  to  the  False  Consensus,  people  expect  that  other  people’s  behaviour  is  the  same  as  the 
behaviour prescribed by their own value orientation. It means, for example, that competitors expect 
others to be competitors too, and the same is true for individualists and competitors. 
These considerations may be translated in terms of conformity, distinguishing why an individual chooses 
to comply according to his/her expectations, or to his/her own behaviour. In any case, assuming one 
causal relation is more suitable to our hypothesis than the other one, it may be useful to explain our 
between-group differences in terms of norm compliance, only if the participation would affect beliefs or 
personal behaviour. Following these perspectives, there is no direct quotation  in understanding if, and 
eventually how, participation can play a role. 
Among instruments to resolve an opportunistic problem, Kerr (1992) considers social interdependence, 
which may reinforce the group identity through reciprocal commitments among people. This can be 
achieved by the definition of a common goal, based on the respect of the group’s norm.  
Yamagishi  (1996)  suggests  the  implementation  of  a  Sanctioning  System  and  a  Structural 
Goal/Expectation (SG/E) to limit the free riding inefficacy. Efficient levels of contribution are observed 
if they are supported by mutual co-operation and mutual trust. In this sense, free riding could be limited 
if, in the game, we insert a sanctioning system, seen as an achievement of a group’s goal, and obtained 
by the co-operation of the agents. This is properly related to what the author defines as instrumental and 
elementary co-operation. 
Social interdependence, which differs from simple interaction, is reinforced every time  communication 
is possible among the group members. This feature is well known in economic experiments about free 
riding, where an increase of co-operation may be due to the possibility of communication (see, for   15 
example, Isaac et al, 1988). Psycho-social contributions explain why communication affects positively 
the contribution levels, in terms of norm influence and of the significance of deviance. 
An  innovative  characteristic,  compared  to  economic  observations,  is  represented  by  the  so-called 
accessibility to the norm. It coincides with the necessity of recalling to people’s minds the importance of 
the  connection  among  individual  efforts  in  social  interaction.  In  other  words,  norms  are  efficiently 
activated if they are rapidly accessible, recalling that individual efforts - contribution in our frame- 
produce a perceptible difference at aggregated level.  
Direct reference to a participation effect, is stressed by Neuberg and Fiske (1987), by defining the role of 
outcome-dependence. Outcome-dependence is a situation that arises when a person is dependent on 
another individual to obtain a desired outcome, and that outcome cannot be attained through the person’s 
own effort alone. Being outcome-dependent would make  the participants evaluate more closely the 
information they received about others. This may support our hypothesis, if we were to translate the 
desired outcome into our public fund, and the information evaluation into the explicit procedure in 
norm’s constitution. In our experimental design, we do not adopt a specific frame to directly test the 
consideration of Neuberg and Fiske (1987); however, it would be inserted in our explanations of the 
results.  
 
3. Experimental design and procedures  
The game
5 is proposed to two groups, the experimental (Constituent) group and the Control one. Each 
group consists of 14 members, chosen randomly (by voluntary subscription to the game) among the 
Students of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Trento. 
Before the game starts, each member is given a personal identity number (ID), in order to maintain the 
anonymity condition during the entire game, and to allow experimenters to follow personal choices. 
Each participant is provided with the payoff table, the game instructions, and a first card for the first 
allocation choice. Before making the first choice, all the instructions are read aloud by the experimenter 
and any doubts are clarified.  
The sequence of the game is the following (see details in the next sections): 
1.  Both groups play five rounds of the “basic game”. The “basic game” belongs to the family of 
public good games with a voluntary contribution mechanism with repetition, without infra-group 
communication, and with the insertion of the donor behaviour’s structure.  
At the beginning of each round, people have to decide their personal investment choice and write 
it  down  on  a  choice  card.  After  this,  the  experimenter  collects  all  the  choice  cards  and 
communicates the total amount of public good provided. 
                                                
5 The complete instructions are available on request.   16 
2.  The  Constituent  Group  proceeds  with  the  “constituent  game”,  in  which  the  control  norm  is 
determined by a discussion phase followed by a voting rule (majority required). The final rule 
may be considered as a puzzle consisting of five different parts (components of the norm). Each 
part is determined in a separate phase. In each phase, people have to decide their preferred option 
among a list. After reading each option, people freely discuss the effect of a single option, and 
then they vote anonymously for their preferred ones. The option that obtains the majority is 
called the “finalist”. This procedure is repeated for all five parts. At the end, the constituent 
group determines the final rule, by joining the five different options, one for each part. 
3.  Both groups have the possibility to discuss the existence of the norm in an identical interval of  
time, by means of discussing phases in the constituent group, and of a discussion period in the 
control group.  
4.  Finally, each group is presented once more with the “basic game”, and subjects play again the 
initial game, but both groups have to respect the norm determined by the experimental group (we 
call this “basic game with norm”). 
The effective final payoff is determined according to the personal performances in the “basic game with 
norm”. In particular it is based on the personal performance observed in one round extracted randomly 
by the experimenter at the end of the game.  
 
A.  The “Basic Game” (BG) 
 
The  basic  game  is  a  classical  public  good  game  with  voluntary  contribution  mechanism,  without 
communication, and with repetition upon five rounds. 
The initial endowment of 10 euros has to be allocated into two funds, a private fund (Y) and a collective 
fund (Q), with the only restraint that the sum of the parts has to be equal to the initial endowment. The 
choice is made considering a payoff table, initially illustrated to the 28 members. 
In our case, the payoff function is the following: 
 
л = y (1+ p) + Q (1+ r) /14                    
s.t  y + q =10           [where л is the payoff; 
                 y represents the allocation to the private fund Y; 
                q represents the allocation to the collective fund Q; 
    p is the constant rate of return associated with a Y; 
    Q is the total amount present in the collective fund 
    (given by the sum of the 14 q's);  
                 r is the variable rate of return for Q]. 
   17 
The distinctive difference between the two funds is represented by the remuneration modality for the 
invested sums. For the private one, the rate is fixed at 5%; for the collective fund, the rate is variable and 
increasing, and it is correlated to the money present in the fund itself (obtained by summing all of the 14 
individual contributions, q). Nevertheless, the different rates of return respect the condition of marginal 
pre  capita  return
6  that-  considering  the  theoretic  arguments-  predicts  that  the  collective  fund  will 
converge to zero. 
In particular, the payoff structure has the characteristic of introducing the donation for the collective 
fund. The allocation in Q does not constitute a sure investment, for the reason that the initial sum 
invested   is not assured to  the  subject. In  fact,  this component  goes to  increment the fund that is, 
however, shared with all the members, independent of the individual contribution. The inserted modality 
arises the risk of the loss associated with the collective investment, in the case that only few agents 
choose it. 
The optimal choice for the single agent corresponds to the investment of the whole endowment in the 
private fund. This assures the return of the sum invested, increased by the corresponding guaranteed 
interest. Independently of the choice of the others, there is an equilibrium with q= 0 euros. On the other 
hand, by inserting a variable and increasing rate of interest in the public good, also the collective fund 
allows one to obtain high profits but, in this case, these are associated with the level of Q and, thus, 
strictly dependent upon the contribution of the other agents. 
 
B.  The “Constituent game” 
 
This game is of an atypical kind and it is the original element of our experiment. It consists of the 
determination of a norm of control by the experimental group. To this end, the players are told that the 
norm concerns the repression of opportunism, which means inserting punishment for the contribution to 
the collective fund from 0 to 4 euros (weak free riding). 
The agents have to discuss and vote step by step the five components of the control norm, one in each 
phase of the game. They establish: 
1.  When the control takes place (1
st. phase; 1
st. component) 
2.  The number of subjects to be investigated (2
nd. phase; 2
nd. component) 




4.  The type of reward (4
th. phase; 4
th. component) 
5.  The type of sanction (5
th. phase; 5
th. component) 
                                                
6 In order to have a unique equilibrium of dominant strategies, in the marginal per capita return (MPCR= r/p) it is necessary 
to consider the following condition (see Sefton and Steinberg, 1996): 
MPCR<1<MPCR·n*, where n* is the group size at equilibrium.   18 
Each component presents several options, established considering different levels of a trade-off personal 
benefit- group benefit, also in relation to a ratio cost- certainty of the control.  
At the end of the discussion of the single options, within a specific time determined before the phase, 
agents have to vote anonymously for their preferred alternative. The option that obtains the majority is 
called the winner. After repeating the procedure for the other components, the final rule is formed, 
consisting of the combination of the winning options of each phase. 
The established rule is applied to the Basic Game in the experimental group, identifying in this way a 
self-determined norm. On the other hand, the norm is directly inserted in the Basic Game of the control 





We now test our fundamental hypothesis, that is: 
Gcontrol Gconst Q Q >  
where 
)] ( ) ( [ P g F f Q Q Gconst + =  
)] ( [ F f Q Q Gcontrol=  
We compare the impact of the final norm
8 in both groups, in terms of its effect on: 
1.  the total number of pure free riders (i.e. no personal contribution to the public fund), the total 
number of free riders (i.e. the number of people that give personal contribution to the public fund 
between  4 0 ≤ ≤ i q ), 
2.  the total public fund provided  
3.  the personal contribution. 
 
We use non-parametric tests to check if the observed differences are statistically significant. For all of 
the following results, we find that there is a significant difference between the two groups at 95% level 
of confidence. In particular: 
1. We test the hypothesis H0 of no difference between the total number of free riders in the constituent 
group, and in the control group, that is: 
H0: FRconst = FRcontrol 
H1: FRconst ≠ FRcontrol 
                                                
7 Here we report the result of our first pilot experiment.  
8 In the pilot experiment, the final norm is the following: “In a round extracted at the end of the game, 5 persons will be 
controlled. Among them, if anyone had contributed from 0 to 4 € to the Public Fund, she/he would not receive anything,, but 
if she/he had, she/he would receive 2% of the net public fund in recompense. 
The total cost for the norm’s implementation is  3.5% of the public fund, Q”.    19 
Result 1 
The p-value is 0.00035. Given p<0.05, we reject the null hypothesis. Given the same control norm, in 
the Constituent Group we observe a significantly smaller number of free riders, both total and pure ones 
(see Graphs 1 and 2). 
 
Graph 1. 
































































2. We test the Hypothesis H0 of no difference between the total public fund provided in the two groups, 
that is: 
H0: Qconst = Qcontrol 
H1: Qconst ≠ Qcontrol 
   20 
Result 2 
The approximate p-value is 0.0< 0.05, so that we reject the null Hypothesis. 
Given the same control norm, in the Constituent Group, we have a significantly higher level of total 
public contribution (see graph 3 below). 
 
Graph 3. 























3. We now test the Hypothesis H0 of no difference in personal contribution, that is: 
H0: dnbq const = dnbq control 
H0: dnbq const ≠ dnbq control 
 
Result 3 
The approximate p-value is 0.0001< 0.05, so we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative 
one.  
Given the same control norm, in the Constituent Group personal contributions are significantly more 















The experimental literature acknowledges the improving effect of a norm application in public good 
games. In this sense, also our experiment reports higher levels of contributions after the norm insetting. 
In the literature, however, there is no prediction about the effect of different ways of insetting a norm. In 
our case, higher levels of contributions, and smaller numbers of free riders (strong, weak and total), are 
observed in the constituent group. There is also a personal propensity to contribute more in the group 
that creates and self applies the norm. All of these results are connected with the only difference between 
the groups, which is the participation in the norm-creation in the constituent group. 
We have already run the same version of the pilot experiment two other times
9, and also in these cases, 
we have obtained significant differences between the two groups
10, in the same direction as the pilot one. 
We may define a sort of behavioural regularity, i.e. participation in the creation of a constituent rule 
improves the level of contributions to a public good. 
The aim of these pilot experiments, is to test (firstly in aggregate terms) if the different modality of 
inserting a rule may play a role, ceteris paribus, without entering into details and without explaining why 
and how this participation improves the effectiveness of a norms. 
To open our “black box” g function, that is to test several hypotheses about the components of the 
participation variable,  it  is absolutely  necessary  to modify some characteristics  of our experimental 
design. We cannot exclude that in the constituent group there may be a set of possible elements, that 
                                                
9 Further details are available on request. 
10Of course, the total amount of public good provided depends on the type of  norm chosen. For example, there are norms 
potentially more severe in terms of punishment than others (in terms of different options’ composition), and this has effect on 
individual contribution, in line with several experiments on rewards and punishment (see for example Sefton, M. Shuump, R. 
Walzer, M.J, 2006) 
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concur  to  explain  our  experimental  provisional  gap.  For  example,  we  may  consider  the  following 
explanations for the higher level of public good provided in the constituent group: 
a) Interdependence and group-effect due to communication. This could be an important element if, in the 
control group, communication were not allowed. On the contrary, both groups can discuss the existence 
of the norm, so that this element seems to play a role, but not the most important.  
b) Decomposition of the norm. The difference may exist in the decisional phase, where the constituent 
group decomposes step by step the single elements. In this sense, it is not simple communication that 
may have an effect, but rather a sort of cognitive feedback due to the facility in better understanding the 
effectiveness of a possible norm. This could be linked with the so-called accessibility of the norm, and 
with the procedural simplification. 
c)  Sanctioning  system  as  group  goal.  Inserting  a  group  goal  may  focus  agents’  attention  on  goal 
achievement (free riding repression), also in terms of inner coherence. 
d) Group identity and other social factors. Socio-psychological literature may consider the effect of 
group identity circumscribed to the norm creation, and in this sense identifying a group responsibility to 
achieve the final goal. 
e) Conformity reasons. In the constituent group the norm may represent a social focal point, on which 
people focus their attention.  
f) Belief explanations. Participating in a norm creation may represent a signal for others to co-operate in 
subsequent rounds. 
g) Committee costs. It is still not defined whether in the constituent group there are greater costs in terms 
of decisional costs. These may be linked with a greater group effort in terms of personal contribution, in 
order to compensate the decisional costs. 
h)  Effectiveness  effect.  Participating  in  a  norm  creation  may  increase  the  perception  of  individual 
effectiveness in a small group size. This may underline the role of individual contribution in obtaining 
the final goal.  
These are only several possible explanations, but they remain at a hypothetical level, since none of them 




With our pilot experiment and its two replications, we observed a sort of behavioural regularity. In a 
public good game with voluntary contribution mechanisms, and with a control norm insertion, the level 
of total public good provided, the total number of free riders (strong and weak), and the individual 
contribution, are significantly related to the modality by which a norm is inserted into the game. 
Participating in a constituent group, that decides what norm should be created and  adopted, seems to be 
relevant for improving the level of public good provided, ceteris paribus.    23 
In this preliminary version, we limited our observations to the main aggregate comparison, without 
entering details of justification. Many contributions may be useful to support our hypothesis and our 
tests, even if none of them have an explicit quotation to our peculiar frame.  
We recognise, in a multidisciplinary approach, an added value, by means of non economic contributions. 
In any case, these remain in the class of possible explanations, because it is necessary to adapt our 
design to test them separately. 
Several  modifications  are  being  considered  for  our  future  developments,  in  particular  to  keep  the 
environment controlled under these considerations. 
We  want  to  analyse  the  participation  effect  in  an  individual  perspective,  in  order  to  isolate  some 
considerations in terms of expectations or beliefs about personal effectiveness and others’ conformity. 
To  this  end,  it  is  important  to  monitor  individual  contribution  following  some    hypotheses  about 
expectations.   
It could be interesting to analyse the voting choices and the corresponding contribution behaviours, to 
check if some parallelisms or strategic issues exist in the constituent group. 
As shown above, our pilot experiment is only a first step towards the extension of further hypotheses, 
starting from the behavioural regularity due to the participation effect.   24 
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